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Abstract: Empirical Evidence and the Case for Foreign Aid

This paper addresses an important methodological question for a recent debate in global
justice: What types of data are necessary for settling normative debates about foreign aid?
Recently, several philosophers have considered the case for foreign aid and have
concluded that foreign aid is either ineffective or counter-productive. This paper
considers what kinds of evidence those doing applied philosophy must use to support
different claims about aid’s efficacy. Then, using some of the best available data, this
paper makes a strong case for at least some foreign aid. This paper’s methodological
lessons, however, are quite general. It considers what types of data are necessary for
establishing the kinds of empirical claims often relied upon in the political philosophy
and public policy literature.
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Empirical Evidence and the Case for Foreign Aidi
1. Introduction
In his groundbreaking article, ''Famine, Affluence, and Morality,'' Peter Singer
gave the following argument:
1) Suffering and death from lack of food and shelter and medicine are bad.
2) If we can do something to help prevent suffering and death from lack of food and
shelter and medicine without sacrificing anything morally significant (or of morally
comparable worth) then we should.
3) So we should help prevent this suffering and death by giving foreign aid.ii
Recently, several philosophers have questioned Singer’s implicit assumption that we can
do something to help prevent suffering and death from lack of food and shelter and
medicine by giving foreign aid.iii These critics argue that foreign aid is either ineffective
or counter-productive.iv This paper is not concerned to address the details of particular
critics’ arguments (the critics appeal to a mixture of fundamental principles and empirical
considerations).v Rather, this paper examines the kind of empirical justification necessary
to arrive at sound conclusions regarding aid’s efficacy. vi Using the best available data, the
paper then makes a strong case for at least some foreign aid programs. That aid can do
some good may not be very surprising. Those who deny this claim must show that aid
generally does more harm than good.vii Those who endorse it need only show that aid can
do some good. The heavy burden is on the negative.viii Since, however, critics have
recently argued that Singer is wrong in claiming that aid can do some good, it is worth
defending Singer on this point.ix
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This paper’s methodological lessons are, moreover, quite general. It considers
what types of data are necessary for establishing the kinds of empirical claims often
relied upon in the political philosophy and public policy literature. This is important as
such empirical claims underlie debates about everything from free trade, to immigration
policy, and taxation to population control and many of the same problems that beset
critics of aid also undermine arguments in these other areas.x
Before making the case for some foreign aid programs, the next section will
consider the different kinds of -- micro- and macro- level -- empirical data available. xi
Macro-level data tells us how aid affects (or types of aid affect) all countries (or at least
large regions). Micro-level data tells us how particular aid projects or small subsets of
projects are doing. So the best data to use if one wants to conclude that aid is generally
good or bad is macro-level data. Micro-data is better if one wants to know whether a
particular aid program is good or bad.
2. The Macro-Level Data
There have been roughly three waves of macro-level work on foreign aid’s
efficacy.xii Studies in all three look, primarily at aid’s impact on growth. xiii Over time
these studies have become more sophisticated testing more complicated models of how
different kinds of aid impact growth.xiv Some surveys of the literature, such as that of C.
Michalopoulos and V. Sukhatme and H. White, suggest that the evidence is ambiguous. xv
One of the latest and most comprehensive reviews by H. Hansen and Finn Tarp suggests,
however, that ‘aid works, even in countries hampered by an unfavorable policy
environment.’xvi They question the robustness and appropriateness of models underlying
many of the studies which deny this conclusion.
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Unfortunately, the evidence about aid’s impact on growth cannot tell us what
impact aid has on the global poor.xvii Even if aid increases growth, it may not reduce
poverty. Growth can increase even if the poor become poorer as long as the rich or
middle class gain more than the poor lose. Furthermore, different causes of growth affect
the poor differently. xviii The growth impact of aid alone does not tell anything about how
aid impacts poverty.xix
Fortunately, there are some relevant studies (though different ways of measuring
aid’s impact on poverty yield different results).xx Peter Boone, for instance, shows that
non-military aid did not reduce infant mortality, increase life expectancy, or increase
primary schooling in the 1970’s and 1980’s.xxi More recently, however, Paul Mosley,
John Hudson, and Arjan Verschoor find that aid positively impacts pro-poor spending in
low income countries and usually reduces income poverty and infant mortality. xxii They
find that aid has an especially large positive impact on poverty when there is not too
much inequality or corruption. Boone’s study does not consider aid’s impact on infant
mortality in low income countries in the 1970’s and 1980’s. So, even if Boone is right,
Mosley et. al.’s study gives us reason to think aid generally reduced infant mortality in
low income countries in the 70’s and 80’s. When inequality and corruption are low, there
is also reason to think aid has a positive impact on income poverty in these countries. xxiii
Others replicate some of these results finding even greater impacts of aid from European
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on infant mortality than Official Bilateral Aid
which affects public sector spending.xxiv A recent study by Karuna Gomanee and Oliver
Morrissey looks at aid’s impact on public expenditure, infant mortality, and the Human
Development Index (HDI). Looking at a panel of countries from 1980-1998 Gomanee
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and Morrissey find that aid increases public expenditures and decreases mortality rates
(increasing the HDI).xxv Though there may not be enough macro-level data to conclude
that aid generally reduces poverty, there is evidence in favor of some kinds of aid.xxvi
Nevertheless, trying to make a general case for aid may be like trying to make a
general case for investment.xxvii If Singer is right, what we really need to know is what
investments to make and what aid to give. xxviii So the next section will turn to the microlevel data to get more information.xxix
3. The Micro-Level Data
Micro-level data can be experimental, quasi-experimental, or non-experimental
(so can macro-level data, though most of it is quasi- or non-experimental). Most microlevel data is non-experimental. Non-experimental evidence can include, for instance,
historical records, observational studies, and anecdotal evidence. Both quasiexperimental and experimental evaluations help test the causal efficacy of aid programs;
they help insure a study’s internal validity. A study has high internal validity when it
captures the causal relationships between the particular program, policy, or process being
evaluated and the particular outcome observed (no matter how unique the circumstances
of the study). In experimental studies people (or other units of analysis) are assigned
randomly to treatment groups (e.g. those receiving aid) and comparison groups (e.g. those
not receiving aid).xxx This helps isolate a program’s impact on participants. Quasiexperimental studies do not use random assignment to insure internal validity. Instead,
researchers try to minimize selection bias (the bias that results from differences between
the treatment and the comparison groups) in other ways.
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Experimental data is often best for insuring internal validity. xxxi Random
assignment to treatment and comparison groups ensures that, on average, there will be no
relevant differences between participants and non-participants. With a quasi-experimental
design participants are more likely to differ from those in the comparison group in
important ways.
An example will help illustrate the advantages and limitations of experimental
and quasi-experimental studies. Suppose we want to evaluate an aid program to reduce
malnutrition in a particular village. If villagers or researchers decide who gets to
participate, there may be a selection bias. Many participants, for example, may be well
nourished. Even if participants do better than non-participants researchers will not know
if the program was successful.
Using a quasi-experimental method may help. Consider, for example, one such
method -- regression discontinuity design. With regression discontinuity design,
researchers use explicit selection criteria to select participants to receive aid. Aid might,
for example, only be offered to people who are underweight for their age. The
comparison group would then be made up of those who are just over the weight limit.
Next, researchers see if there is a discontinuity in how people fare just above and just
below the cutoff point for inclusion in the program.
Consider a graphical illustration of the results. The x’s indicate those who start
out underweight and so receive aid; the o’s indicate those who start out over-weight. In
the first graph aid has no effect. In the second aid has a good effect. On average, those
receiving aid do better than those not receiving aid at the cut-off point (notice the
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discontinuity).

Unfortunately, there can be differences between those just above and below the
cutoff point and this can cause problems for this kind of quasi-experimental evaluation.
Those just above the cutoff point might, for example, be able to participate in another aid
program. If so, creating a comparison group made up of people right above the cut off
point will introduce selection bias. Contrasting the treatment with the comparison group
will not tell us whether the aid program is successful; we will not know how the
malnourished would have fared without aid.
7

True experiments better prevent selection bias; randomization gives us reason to
think the treatment group is relevantly similar to the control group. It will not matter if
those above the weight limit can participate in another aid program. With proper
randomization, the comparison group will be made up of people who, like those receiving
aid, are below the limit. So, it should be easier to conclude that a perceived effect is due
to aid.xxxii
Experimental evaluations can help us determine the efficacy not only of particular
programs but of different aid processes and policies. Many evaluations of microfinance
test processes like particular loan or savings products, for instance. xxxiii Other evaluations
the efficacy of different policies regarding, for example, the distribution of things like
bed nets.xxxiv And it is possible to use experimental micro-level studies to predict
responses to macro-level policies (though larger samples are necessary to do this sort of
research). For instance, researchers have recently evaluated how young women in Kenya
respond to an AIDS awareness campaign that explains how older partners are more likely
to have acquired HIV. They predict that the program will reduce HIV transmission rates
amongst teenage girls in Kenya as it encourages young women to sleep with those in
their age cohort.xxxv
It is important, however, to be careful not to generalize beyond what the data
warrants. A good program can fail because the staff, beneficiaries, culture, or
environment changes. Test projects can be more exciting and, so, more successful than
normal programs just because they are test projects; this is called the Hawthorne effect.
Fortunately, there are ways to deal with such problems. Increasing the time span and
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scale of the evaluation reduces the Hawthorne effect, for example. Testing programs in
multiple locations at a large scale strengthens the case for replication or scaling up.
Often, however, experiments are hard to perform. Participants can drop out of
treatment and those in the control group can sometime gain access to treatment illicitly.
If, for instance, the program to combat malnutrition was offered at randomly selected
schools, parents might move their children to schools offering the program (or away from
such schools). This may bias results. Similarly, researchers may select a biased sample.
If, for instance, researchers randomly select people to participate in a study from a nonrepresentative subgroup of a population (say, students participating in an after-school
program), they may inadvertently end up with results that will not generalize well to the
other segments of the population.
There are ways of dealing with some of these problems. Double-blinding is a
traditional solution to minimizing selection problems. If neither researchers nor
participants know who is receiving treatment that will prevent much intentional
manipulation. But it may be hard to find an appropriate ‘placebo’ in the context of an aid
program (parents and students usually know what kinds of programs are being carried out
in local schools). Worse, inadvertent selection biases can be just as problematic as
intentional selection effects. People may move out of a study area for reasons other than
their desire to remain in or leave the program. Furthermore, the above example illustrates
how researchers may select biased samples precisely because they do not recognize
potential problems.
Yet more problematic is the fact that, because researchers are selecting only a
small number of participants (and doing so from a small population), we can expect that
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even truly randomly selected groups will exhibit some potentially biasing regularities.
One group may, for instance, include more boys than the other group. Theoretically,
randomization guarantees that there are no differences between the treatment and control
groups. But, this is only guaranteed if there is an infinite sample from which to choose.
Obviously, in the real world, samples are not infinite. So, simply due to chance, the two
groups may differ in significant ways.
To deal with potentially problematic differences between treatment and control
groups due to chance, participants may be matched along potentially distorting
dimensions (e.g. their sex) before being randomized. One person from each stratified
matched pair would receive treatment. The other would become part of the control group.
Alternately, there are ways of taking into account potentially relevant factors
econometrically. In effect, however, using these methods or stratified matching, makes
the resulting evidence quasi-experimental rather than fully experimental. (One must
assume that there are no other factors that explain observed differences that have not been
taken into account).xxxvi Nevertheless, randomization is an important tool (amongst others)
that helps us take into consideration potential differences between these groups. So, this
paper will consider experimental as well as quasi-experimental micro-level evidence
regarding aid’s efficacy below. This evidence will let us conclude that there are lots of
good aid programs that can probably be successfully replicated and scaled up.
4. Making the Case for Some Foreign Aid
Both advocates and critics of aid are concerned about how aid impacts the poor.
Few explicitly consider how we should measure aid’s impact on the poor. So before
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arguing that there are lots of good aid programs, this paper will consider what a good
program looks like.
There are many ways to measure poverty. We might, for instance, use an
assortment of indicators such as education and caloric intake. Alternately, we might use a
unitary measure of poverty. Unitary measures either specify a single formula for
combining many disparate indicators of poverty or specify a single indicator (like income
or Gross Domestic Product (GDP)).
In discussing the macro-level data, this paper suggested that, if we care about how
aid impacts the poor, growth in aggregate GDP is not a good (unitary) indicator of aid’s
success. It cited studies that used a mixture of indicators. Better unitary measures are the
Human Development Index (HDI) and the World Bank’s poverty lines. The HDI
combines (the logarithm of) GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP), literacy
and primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment rates, and life expectancy at birth into a
single indicator.xxxvii The World Bank uses (PPP) income-based measures of poverty.xxxviii
The HDI includes more than income. This is a mark in its favor. Unfortunately, it
has some problems. Poverty may be correlated with GDP per capita at PPP, literacy and
primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment rates, and life expectancy at birth. But, it is
not clear that the HDI is a better measure of poverty than the alternatives (education,
income, and life expectancy may each be correlated with poverty in different ways and
one of these may, alone, provide a better proxy for poverty than the combination). xxxix We
need a philosophical account of poverty to decide which way of measuring poverty is
best. But neither the United Nations Development Program nor Amaryta Sen who helped
develop the measure has specified what set of basic functionings people need to be able
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to avoid poverty.xl The point is not just, as Sen recognized, that the HDI does not provide
a complete measure and conceals important dimensions of poverty. xli The point is that
some philosophical justification is necessary to establish that the HDI is even a
reasonably good indicator.
Worse, the HDI is relies on average income levels, so it cannot tell us how many
poor people there are within a country. xlii A country where half of the population is well
off, and half very poorly off, may have the same HDI as a country where everyone is
doing equally, and moderately, well.xliii Germany, for instance, has the 14th most equal
income distribution, while Hong Kong is 84th. xliv But Germany’s HDI of .930 very close
to Hong Kong’s .916.

xlv

This last problem is so severe, it basically renders the HDI

useless for our purposes.xlvi
Because the World Bank’s poverty lines avoid this problem, we might use one of
these indicators instead. But, the Bank’s poverty lines share another problem with the
HDI that stems from the PPP exchange rates they rely upon.
PPP exchange rates make incomes comparable between countries and individuals
in different countries. Consider a simple example of how to calculate such an exchange
rate between two countries for a single good. Suppose it costs one dollar to get a bag of
corn in the US and two pesos to do so in Mexico. The PPP exchange rate for corn would
be 2:1 (.5 pesos to a dollar or 2 dollars to a peso). PPP exchange rates are calculated for
many countries to find relative prices for many of the goods and services that make up
GDP. They usually express the result in terms of US$ equivalents.xlvii
There are several problems with relying on PPP exchange rates in measuring
poverty. First, the data these measures rely upon is questionable. PPP measures are based
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on the Penn World Tables (PWT) and the International Comparison Project (ICP)
surveys. These surveys are of variable quality and often measure different things (e.g.
income vs. consumption) they must be adjusted significantly to make them consistent. xlviii
Furthermore, these surveys do not have adequate coverage.xlix In 2005 China was
included for the first time and India for the first time since 1985. l So the surveys may not
provide good estimates of poor countries’ incomes or the incomes of the poor within
those countries.
Furthermore, the most common methods of comparing purchasing power make it
seem like the poor are doing better than they are. The Geary-Khamis method, for
instance, basically averages international price differentials for all commodities
weighting ‘each commodity in proportion to its share in international consumption
expenditure.’li Essentially it considers how much it costs in each country to purchase the
average ‘basket’ of goods consumed in all countries. The problem is that this ‘basket’
includes many services, for instance, that the poor do not buy but that are relatively cheap
in developing countries.lii This makes it seem like the poor in these countries are doing
better than they are. For, while food is relatively cheap in developing countries, it is not
as cheap as PPP estimates suggest. liii Services have also come to make up a lager
proportion of the international consumption ‘basket’ over time. This makes it seem that
the poor are doing better simply because of a change in the rich’s consumption patterns.
Fortunately, there may be some ways of ameliorating the problems with PPP
measures. For calculating the World Bank’s poverty lines, it might help to compare
purchasing power over a representative basket of goods the poor consume, for instance.liv
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Even if such changes were made, however, it is not clear that the World Bank’s
poverty lines would accurately capture the amount of poverty in a situation. For, more
than money matters to the poor and different people need different amounts of money to
avoid poverty. Subsistence farmers whose states provide health care and education, for
instance, may not need much money. So if aid harms the poor financially but brings them
greater benefits of a different type, it may decrease poverty. Alternately, aid may bring
small financial benefits to the poor but harm the poor greatly in other ways and so
increase poverty. Income is just one indicator of poverty. It may not be the best indicator.
Having more than one indicator may be best.
So, this paper will consider what micro-level studies tell us about how aid impacts
individuals’ access to things like education, health care, food, water, and shelter. It will
assume that if aid helps people get these things, it reduces poverty. lv Of course, different
indicators of poverty (like health and education levels) can exhibit opposite trajectories.
Without a unitary measure, we may not be able to tell whether an aid program is making
things better or worse overall. It may also be impossible to tell how much things are
getting better or worse if, for instance, we find that an aid program helps some people get
education but makes it less likely that others will get sufficient food. Sometimes, more
than one thing may also be necessary to decrease poverty. Some medicines, for instance,
may not work without food. Still, if a program helps people get basic water, food, shelter,
health care, or education without making it harder for people to access these things that is
evidence that the program reduces poverty. After all, helping people secure some of these
things may help them secure others. If, for instance, children are well-nourished, they
may learn more in school. At least I hope the advocates and critics of aid can agree on
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this much. On this assumption, this paper will look at programs funded by many sources
governmental and non-governmental.
About ¼ of the world’s population is infected with worms like schistosomiasis
and hookworm.lvi These infections can cause protein deficiency, anemia, and other kinds
of malnutrition, which can interfere with children’s schooling. In parts of Kenya, more
than 90% of school children are infected with worms. lvii Internationaal Chistelijk
Steunfonds Africa, a Dutch non-governmental organization and the District Ministry of
Health started de-worming children in Kenyan schools. Researchers wanted to carry out
an experimental evaluation of the program in Kenya’s Busia school district.
Unfortunately, administrators would not allow random numbers to determine which
schools would get the medication. So the researchers used a heuristic for randomness
based on the alphabet.lviii They found that the program decreased absenteeism by 25
percent or more. Because the program lowered illness transmission rates, absenteeism
even decreased in nearby schools.lix The program was replicated in India. It was extended
to provide iron supplements since lots of the Indian children were anemic. One year later,
‘researchers found a nearly 50% reduction in moderate to severe anemia, large weight
gains, and a 7% reduction in absenteeism among 4-6 year olds.’lx
Most of the world’s poor live in rural areas and farming is essential to their
survival. So, aid is often directed at increasing agricultural yields and, thus, food supplies.
In the rural Busia District of Western Kenya a Dutch NGO International Child Support
decided to start a seed and fertilizer program. Parents of students in the local school were
randomly selected to participate in the program for six years. The farmers were given
Calcium Ammonium Nitrate fertilizer to apply to a randomly selected plot of land and
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hybrid maize to plant along with Di-Ammonimum Phosphate fertilizer for another
randomly selected plot. A comparison plot was randomly selected for traditional seed and
fertilizer. The NGO also provided help in the first applications, tracked farmers’ progress,
and assisted with harvesting and weighing the crops. The quantities of fertilizer provided
varied between growing seasons. Researchers found that the right amount of fertilizer and
seeds could increase yields by over 90%.lxi Further, the evidence suggested that welltimed price reductions induce some farmers to purchase and apply fertilizers
themselves.lxii
Globally only five out of six boys and four out of five girls are in elementary
school.lxiii The Inter-American Development Bank along with the Mexican government,
created a conditional cash transfer project called Progresa/Oportunidades to help the
poorest educate and get medical care for their children.lxiv Mothers of participating
children had to attend nutrition and health programs (e.g. prenatal care, nutrition
monitoring, well-baby care, immunization, supplementation, and preventive care
programs).lxv Their children received scholarships to go to school -- with larger
scholarships going to girls than boys. When the government wanted to expand the
program half of the 506 eligible communities were randomly selected to participate.
Comparing educational and health outcomes in these communities to those in the
comparison group, outside experts at the University of California Berkeley showed that
children who stayed in the program for two years were about 40% less likely to fall ill
than children who did not participate.lxvi They were also about 25% less likely to be
anemic, grew quicker, and returned to school more frequently after emergencies. lxvii On
average, the percentage of children enrolled in first through eighth grades increased 3.4%
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in participating communities.lxviii The percentage of girls who completed sixth grade rose
14.8%.lxix Even adults benefited. Parents took 19% fewer sick days, on average. lxx
Progresa/Oportunidades was so successful that it was extended to urban schools
throughout Mexico. Similar evaluations show that conditional cash transfer programs are
successful around the world.lxxi
In India only 35% of females and 61% of Males were literate in 1990. lxxii In 1994,
Pratham, an Indian non-governmental organization supported by several aid agencies
(including OXFAM, NOVIB, and AIF), began a remedial education program. Pratham
hired local women to tutor children who were doing poorly in elementary school. An
experimental evaluation of the program randomly assigned tutors to half of the 98
eligible schools Vandorara city (a similar experiment was performed in the L-ward of the
Mumbai schools). The evaluation showed that the program ‘increased student test scores
by .39 standard deviations.’lxxiii Moreover, the improvements were ‘largest for children at
the bottom of the distribution.’ lxxiv The program resulted in gains, per dollar, ten times
greater than hiring new teachers and its returns improved over time. lxxv Pratham now runs
similar programs in twenty cities for 161,000 children.lxxvi
There are many other successful programs that help people -- from microfinance
to school voucher programs.lxxvii Many of these programs have been successfully
replicated and scaled up.lxxviii We can do some good with foreign aid.
5. Conclusion
In arguing that we are obligated to aid the poor, Peter Singer assumes that we can
use foreign aid to successfully ameliorate poverty.lxxix Recently, several philosophers have
questioned this assumption. Many of aid’s critics fail to provide the requisite kind of data
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to make their case.lxxx So, this paper has canvassed the strengths and weaknesses of
different kinds of empirical evidence for establishing different conclusions about aid’s
efficacy. In doing so, it addressed the more general methodological question: What types
of data are necessary for establishing normative conclusions in debates in political
philosophy and public policy? It defended one answer to this question. It suggested that
macro-level empirical data is necessary to establish general claims about the efficacy of
different policies, while micro-level experimental data is generally best for establishing
claims about the efficacy of particular programs. It, thus, provides some important
guidance for resolving debates about everything from free trade and immigration to
taxation and population control policy.lxxxi
With regard to the debate about foreign aid, in particular, the paper argued that
macro-level data is necessary to make a strong case regarding aid impact on the poor in
general. Unfortunately, most macro-level studies of foreign aid do not address the
question of whether aid generally reduces poverty. Nevertheless, this paper canvassed
some relevant macro-level studies suggesting that certain kinds of aid reduce poverty.
Furthermore, it argued that there are many good micro-level studies suggesting that at
least some foreign aid programs are successful and can be replicated and scaled up.
There are many questions for further research. It would be great to know, for
instance, what factors contribute to successful aid programs, policies, and processes and
how aid is distorted differently by different factors. lxxxii The practical importance of that
knowledge may, however, be limited. For, this paper has done enough to establish
Singer’s implicit empirical premise that aid can ameliorate poverty. So, if the rest of his
argument is right, we can reach the important practical conclusion that we are obligated
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to provide aid that does work. Even if aid is generally a bad idea, we should not neglect
the good we can do for some, even if we cannot completely ameliorate poverty. We need
not only see the forest for the trees, we must not neglect the water for the seas.
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